Level Wirecard Frühling plus X
Liebe Leser von Feingold Research, die meisten haben es sicher bemerkt – seit einigen Wochen finden unsere Tradingideen, Investmentvorschläge, unser Research und unsere Datenanalyse und vor allem unsere Depots und Trades nahezu ausschließlich im Exklusivbereich statt. Einige hundert haben uns schon abonniert, die Kündigungen lassen sich an einer Hand abzählen was wir als Kompliment werten. Unsere Depotperformance in Tradingdepot und Turbo-Depot spricht eine klare Sprache. (Hier können Sie uns abonnieren). Doch weitaus mehr dürfen Sie von uns erwarten abseits der konkreten Ein- und Ausstiegszeitpunkte für Ihre Trades in Wirecard oder Beyond, in DAX oder Euro, in Öl oder Gold. Deshalb wollen wir Ihnen exemplarisch und sozusagen “copy paste”, also ungekürzt einige unserer täglichen Newsletter zur Ansicht geben. 
Hinzu kommt täglich für unsere Abonnenten mindestens ein ausführliches Video in dem wir die Chancen am Markt beleuchten und Sie konkret an die Hand nehmen. Hier also ein weiteres Beispiel unserer Arbeit und dessen was Sie erwarten dürfen:
Vom 25.9.19 – ungekürzt. Dahinter verstecken sich für unsere Abonnenten weitere Research-Papiere und Know-How zum Markt.
Liebe Leser unseres Exklusivbereichs,
hohe Volatilität sorgt mitunter für verrückte Konditionen bei Derivaten.
Folgendes Szenario – eine Aktie kann noch 25 Dollar fallen und wirft via Discount-Call dennoch eine Rendite von 87% ab. Nicht p.a, sondern absolut bis Dezember 2019. Also in 3 Monaten…
Wir legen auf 4,60 Euro mal ein Limit für 500 Stück in der WKN HZ17ER.
Die Volatilität von Beyond Meat ist übrigens ungefähr „Level Wirecard Frühling plus x“…Damit Sie eine Idee haben????
Als Abendlektüre haben wir noch etwas Profi-Research zum Handelskonflikt von Pimco:
When the Stars Are Falling
Joachim Fels, PIMCO Global Economic Advisor
If you thought interest rate levels over the past 5-10 years were uncomfortably low, brace yourself for worse to come: The longer the trade war between the U.S. and China lasts, the more likely it becomes that we are transitioning from a world of “low” to one of “ultra-low” equilibrium real interest rates (r-star, or r*). In fact, the slump in global trade and the inversion of the yield curve in the course of this year suggest that such a regime shift may already be in full swing.
If so, the Fed’s and other central banks’ recent “easing” manoeuvers might not be sufficient to offset the automatic tightening of the monetary policy stance (defined as the gap between actual and equilibrium real rates) that occurs when r* is falling abruptly, and more decisive action might be needed. However, r* is unobservable and empirical estimates of its level are highly uncertain. The yield curve may serve as an rough gauge, with inversion indicating that the actual real short rate still exceeds r*, but ultimately the arbiter of whether policy is too tight or about right will be the momentum of economic activity over the coming quarters.
To conceptualize how the trade war affects r*, I find it useful to consider the impact of rising trade uncertainty on the three main drivers of r*: (1) Potential output growth; (2) the saving/investment (im)balance; and (3) global r*, which via real and capital market linkages affects national r*.
- Potential output growth is likely to be lower in a world of higher tariffs and lasting uncertainty about trade policy because a less competitive environment hampers innovation and increased uncertainty slows corporate investment decisions. Both will lead to a lower growth rate of labor productivity, which along with labor force growth determines potential output growth.
A recent study by Fed researchers estimates that the rise in trade uncertainty to date will reduce business fixed investment by at least 1% over the next year, though the very few episodes with major bouts of trade uncertainty over the past 50 years make such estimates highly uncertain. In any case, the slowdown in business investment growth over the past year and the decline in many measures of business confidence suggest that this factor is significant.
Separately, Chicago Fed President Charles Evans recently indicated that U.S. potential output growth could end up being closer to 1 ½ percent or even lower due to these effects, down from a current estimate of 1 ¾ percent.
- Rising uncertainty about trade and, relatedly, the economic outlook is also likely to lead to higher desired saving and increase the demand for safe assets – the beautiful German phrase “Angstsparen” – saving out of fear – springs to mind. With desired saving up and desired investment down, r* has to decline to balance saving and investment ex-post.
- A trade war also reduces global potential output growth and increases the global saving glut, thus depressing global r*. A recent paper by Oscar Jorda and Alan Taylor (a senior advisor at PIMCO) presented at Jackson Hole argues that the global factor in r* has increased over time (see also my recent blog “Global Fetters” for more detail).
Taken together, there is reason to suspect that lasting trade policy uncertainty significantly reduces r* via these channels. Moreover, it is possible that the transition from the “low” to the “ultra low” r* regime happens abruptly rather than glacially. The vertiginous drop in in global bond yields in July/August may reflect market participants suddenly attaching a much higher probability of being in such an “ultra-low” regime as the tariff war escalated.
Needless to say, these developments pose formidable challenges for the Fed and other central banks. The first challenge is that the evolution of the trade conflict itself is uncertain. While it currently looks likely that it will drag on for an extended period, a comprehensive and credible trade deal cannot be entirely ruled out. If so, how quickly could the Fed realistically reverse any rate cuts implemented in the meantime without causing major market dislocations?
The second challenge is to gauge the new “ultra low” level of r* in the case of continued trade uncertainty. At best, r* can be estimated with hindsight, albeit even then only imprecisely. The shape of the yield curve may be a useful real-time indicator, with inversion indicating that r* is below the actual real policy rate. But the “wisdom of the (market)” crowd” is likely to be imperfect as well. The ultimate arbiter of whether policy is too tight or just right and whether the 50 basis points reduction in the Fed funds rate to date is enough will the momentum of economic activity over the coming quarters.
Normally, I would now describe how we see things evolving here. Instead, for our view of whether a divided Fed is now done cutting rates take a look at Tiffany Wilding’s latest blog piece. And for a more detailed discussion of our updated economic outlook following our Cyclical Forum earlier this month you will have to wait until this coming Thursday when we will release our new Cyclical Outlook. I’ll keep you posted!
Die Börsenwelt feierte vor zwei Wochen den 20. Todestag von André Kostolany. Seine Schlaftablette konnte man in den vergangenen Jahren mehrfach gebrauchen. Die war nämlich wie häufig falsch interpretiert nicht als Buy-and-hold zu verstehen. Wenn die Kurse jedoch in den Keller fallen, sind Nerven gefragt. So geschehen im Dezember 2018 und auch in geringerem Maße im August 2019. Dann nahm man am besten eine Schlaftablette. Dank Draghi und den Notenbanken kam die Belohnung schon wenige Wochen später. Das Resultat sehen Sie in unseren Depots – Chart unten. 
